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ORIGINAL RESEARCH REPORT
Does Exposure to Hostile Environments Predict Enhanced 
Emotion Detection?
Willem E. Frankenhuis and Gijsbert Bijlstra
We used a Face-in-the-Crowd task to examine whether hostile environments predict enhanced detection 
of anger, and whether such enhanced cognition occurs for a different negative emotion, sadness, as well. 
We conducted a well-powered, preregistered study in 100 college students and 100 individuals from a 
community sample with greater exposure to hostile environments. At the group level, the community 
sample was less accurate at detecting both angry and sad faces than students; and, only students 
discriminated anger more accurately than sadness. At the individual level, having experienced more 
violence did not predict enhanced anger detection accuracy. In general, participants had a lower threshold 
(i.e., a more liberal criterion) for detecting emotion in response to anger than sadness. And, students had 
a higher threshold (i.e., a more conservative criterion) for detecting emotion than the community sample 
in response to both anger and sadness. Overall, these findings contradict our hypothesis that exposure to 
hostile environments predicts enhanced danger detection. Rather, our community sample was more prone 
to over-perceiving emotions, consistent with previous studies showing bias in threat-exposed populations. 
Future work is needed to tease apart the conditions in which people exposed to social danger show 
enhanced accuracy or bias in their perception of emotions. 
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Animals adapt to their environments on at least two 
timescales: across generations by natural selection, and 
within lifetimes through development. These processes 
are nested: natural selection shapes developmental 
mechanisms, which produce cognitive and emotional 
systems that tailor individuals to local conditions based on 
experience (Barrett, 2015; Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper, 1991; 
Chisholm, 1999; Ellis, Figueredo, Brumbach, & Schlomer, 
2009; Frankenhuis, Panchanathan, & Barrett, 2013). 
In this paper, we focus on hostile social environments, 
in which threats are common and severe. In such 
environments, mental systems might develop a focus 
on reducing the probability of harm (Belsky, 2008; 
Callaghan & Tottenham, 2016; Ellis & Del Giudice, 2014; 
Frankenhuis, Panchanathan, & Nettle, 2016; Taylor, 
2006; Varnum & Kitayama, 2017). Reducing harm can 
be accomplished by enhancing cognitive abilities for 
detecting threats accurately (Frankenhuis & de Weerth, 
2013), or by lowering the threshold for detection of 
threat, at the expense of increasing the number of ‘false 
alarms’ (Haselton et al., 2009; Haselton & Buss, 2000; 
Nettle & Haselton, 2006). Such ‘erring on the side of 
caution’ might be adaptive when the costs of ‘false 
alarms’ are lower than the costs of ‘misses,’ depending 
also on the base rate of threats (Bateson, Brilot, & Nettle, 
2011; McKay & Efferson, 2010). For instance, it might be 
costlier to infer that an angry person is calm than vice 
versa. 
A cost asymmetry, however, might be absent or less 
distinct for sadness (inferring a sad person is happy), 
which entails lower risk of being harmed. Thus, even if the 
base rates of anger and sadness are similar, and higher in 
hostile environments, we expect thresholds for detecting 
anger to be generally lower than thresholds for detecting 
sadness. Variation in thresholds between negative 
emotions may be mechanistically possible, as previous 
research has shown differences in neural and cognitive 
processing of perceived anger and sadness (Blair, Morris, 
Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 1999; Fox et al., 2000).
Previous studies of anger detection offer mixed results. 
Some studies show that growing up in hostile social 
conditions predicts enhanced accuracy in threat detection 
(reviewed in Ellis, Bianchi, Griskevicius, & Frankenhuis, 
2017; Frankenhuis & de Weerth, 2013). Others report 
bias towards heightened sensitivity to threat (reviewed 
in Crick & Dodge, 1994; De Castro & van Dijk, 2017). For 
instance, physically abused children may orient more 
rapidly to angry faces and voices than controls do, and 
may be more accurate at identifying angry (but not other) 
facial expressions from degraded pictures (Pollak, 2008; 
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Pollak, Messner, Kistler, & Cohn, 2009). But these children 
may also exhibit a response bias toward anger, ascribing 
this emotion to situations where it is not fitting (Pollak, 
Cicchetti, Hornung, & Reed, 2000). Moreover, people 
who come from hostile social environments (e.g., violent 
families) are more likely to attribute hostile intent to 
ambiguous stimuli (e.g., neutral faces) than peers from 
safer environments (Crick & Dodge, 1994; De Castro & van 
Dijk, 2017).
In this study, we examine whether people who have 
experienced more violence are better at detecting threat, 
or overestimate threat, using a Face-in-the-Crowd task 
(i.e., FitC task; Hansen & Hansen, 1988); and whether 
this pattern is specific to anger or occurs for a different 
negative emotion, sadness, as well. We thus use sadness 
as a negative emotion to compare with anger. Whereas 
previous research has focused on well-delineated samples, 
such as children that experienced physical abuse (Pollak, 
2008) or diagnosed with disruptive behavior disorders (De 
Castro & van Dijk, 2017), we assess a heterogeneous adult 
community sample. Our sample includes people who 
live in disadvantaged conditions for Dutch standards and 
who have experienced chronic (prolonged, intense) stress, 
such as exposure to violence, as well as individuals who 
are currently facing an acute stressor, but who have not 
experienced chronic stress. We compare this community 
sample with a lower-adversity sample, college students,1 
allowing us to assess accuracy and bias in emotion 
detection in the middle and lower range of adversity 
experiences, and to check the extent to which extant 
findings obtained with high-adversity samples generalize 
across different levels of adversity experience. We focus 
on the relationships between anger and sadness detection 
and (a) parental aggression, which in extreme cases may 
involve physical abuse, as well as (b) passive exposure 
to neighborhood violence, and (c) active involvement in 
violence. 
At a group level, we expected the community sample 
to be more accurate at detecting an angry face in a 
crowd than the student sample (see Ellis et al., 2017; 
Frankenhuis & de Weerth, 2013). At an individual level, 
we expected people who had experienced more violence 
to be more accurate at detecting an angry face than 
people who had experienced less violence. We expected 
both of these relationships to be specific to anger (‘anger 
superiority’; LoBue, 2009; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 
2001), rather than general to negative faces (‘negativity 
bias’; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999; Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001), because attention to danger tends 
to be more critical for survival and reproduction than 
detecting sadness.
Methods
We preregistered our sample size, materials, hypotheses, 
and statistical analyses at the Open Science Framework: 
https://osf.io/c8fne/. Our data is stored in the DANS 
repository and is accessible at: https://doi.org/10.17026/
dans-zdh-ebhk (Frankenhuis, 2016). Our study was 
approved by the Ethics Committee, Faculty of Social 
Sciences, Radboud University; CSW2014-1310-250.
Participants 
Our goal was to test 200 participants: 100 students and 
100 from the community sample (see Preregistration). 
We initially tested 262 participants. After removing 
participants who had missing data—on the primary 
independent variables or the FitC task—we had 243 
participants: 132 students and 111 from the community 
sample. We then excluded 11 participants from the 
community sample: two outliers (>3 SD on dependent 
variable), and nine for other reasons (e.g., poor vision, 
brain damage, drugged). Next, we excluded the last 
32 students that we accidentally tested beyond our 
preregistered sample size, based solely on their date and 
time of participation, without having seen their data. 
The final sample thus comprised 200 participants:2 100 
students (Mage = 22.44, SD = 4.97, range: 18–61; 64 
females) and 100 from the community sample (Mage = 
40.40, SD = 12.36, range: 18–65; 51 females).3 Participants 
received €10 or €15 compensation, depending on whether 
their total session lasted 60 or 90 minutes.
Materials
Stimuli. We examined emotion detection using a 
novel FitC stimulus set, which we constructed using 
the Radboud Faces Database (Langner et al., 2010). We 
created 36 stimuli. A stimulus consisted of nine photos 
of one Caucasian male face, depicted in a 3-by-3 grid. In 
18 stimuli, all faces showed a neutral expression (neutral 
condition). In nine stimuli, eight faces were neutral and 
one angry (anger condition, see Figure 1). In the other 
nine, eight faces were neutral and one sad (sad condition). 
Per emotion condition, the target emotion appeared 
once at each location in the 3-by-3 grid. Thus, 18 stimuli 
included one emotional expression (among eight 
neutral distractors). The other 18 showed only neutral 
expressions.
Neighborhood violence. We measured past (seven 
items; e.g., “In the neighborhood where I grew up, most 
people felt unsafe walking alone after dark”) and current 
(seven items) exposure to neighborhood violence using 
the Neighborhood Violence Scale (for the development of 
this scale, see Frankenhuis, Roelofs, & de Vries, 2017). The 
subscales are identical except in referring to the past (<18 
years) or present (current experiences). Participants rated 
items on a scale from 1–7 (completely agree-disagree). We 
computed a single score per participant by taking the 
mean over both subscales (α = 0.89). 
Parental aggression. We measured parental aggression 
using two subscales (see Preregistration) of an abbreviated, 
Dutch version of the Parenting Questionnaire (see 
Ellis, Schlomer, Tilley, & Butler, 2012). These subscales, 
maternal aggression and paternal aggression, each 
consisted of four items. The items were statements (e.g., 
“My mother acted in a way that made me afraid that I 
might be physically hurt.”). Participants rated the extent 
to which each statement described their childhood (0–16 
years) on a scale from 1–5 (never-always). We computed a 
single parental aggression score per participant by taking 
the mean over both subscales4 (α = 0.86). A higher score 
indicates greater paternal and maternal aggression. If 
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participants had one parent, we used only that parent’s 
subscale.
Involvement in violence. We measured active 
involvement in violence using a subset of four items (see 
Preregistration) from the Youth Risk Behaviour Survey 
(Eaton et al., 2012). Two items asked about the frequency of 
past involvement (14–17 years) and current involvement 
(in the last year) in a physical fight and needing treatment 
for injuries. Participants rated these on a scale from 1–5 
(0–6+ times). The other two items just asked about the 
frequency of past and current involvement in a physical 
fight. Participants rated these on a scale from 1–8 (0–12+ 
times). These two response scales were identical to the ones 
used in the original Youth Risk Behaviour Survey, allowing 
us to compare samples across different studies. To be able 
to compute averages across scales with different numbers 
of response options (i.e., five or eight), we truncated the 
scores of 13 participants (6.5% of 200) who scored higher 
than five on the eight-option items, assigning them a 
value of five. We computed a single score per participant 
by taking the mean over all four items (α = 0.57). This 
Cronbach’s alpha is too low, implying the subset of results 
relating to this scale has low information value. With this 
caveat, we report our analyses as preregistered.
Procedure 
We recruited the community sample via several 
organizations that help people who live in disadvantaged 
conditions for Dutch standards, facing such stressors as 
eviction and debt relief, unemployment, homelessness, 
previous incarceration, neighborhood and family 
violence. 
The community sample completed the test-battery in 
a room at the respective community organization, and 
students in a test-cubicle at the university. All participants 
completed the same test battery, comprised of the present 
study and three other (non-related) studies, individually, 
in Dutch. Students were tested on a 24-inch desktop; the 
community sample on a 17-inch laptop. 
Each trial started with a fixation-cross in the center of 
the screen (0.5s), followed by a stimulus (1.5s) and then 
a blank screen. Participants could respond only after 
the stimulus had disappeared, while viewing the blank 
screen. So, there was no tradeoff between accumulating 
evidence and responding sooner. By design, the response 
window was indefinite: the blank screen disappeared only 
when participants responded. We created our study to 
assess accuracy, not reaction times (see Preregistration). 
Nonetheless, we provide descriptive statistics about 
Figure 1: Face in the crowd example stimulus containing 8 neutral faces and 1 angry face (for privacy reasons, we 
depict a stimulus not used in the actual study).
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reaction times in Table 2. We did not remove outliers 
based on reaction times.
During each trial, participants indicated whether an 
emotion was present or not by clicking the letter L or 
A, respectively. After a correct response, the next trial 
would start. After an incorrect response, the word “wrong” 
appeared (1s), before the next trial started. There was a 
four-trial practice-block before the test-block. The test-
block consisted of the 36 grids, presented in random 
order, with each grid appearing only once.
Results
We use signal detection theory to analyze accuracy 
and bias (Green & Swets, 1974; Macmillan & Creelman, 
2005). Participants may indicate an emotion when there 
is one (hit) or none (false alarm). We use the proportion 
of hits per emotion and a general false alarm rate (not 
emotion specific) to compute accuracy (d’) and bias 
(c) using formulas provided by Stanislaw and Todorov 
(1999). Distinguishing between accuracy and bias 
is always useful, and absolutely necessary when the 
number of signal (emotion) and noise (neutral faces) 
trials is not equal. For instance, if 90% of all trials 
depict an emotion, participants with lower thresholds 
for detecting an emotion are more likely to respond 
correctly, by chance alone. In the extreme, a participant 
who estimates all trials to depict an emotion attains 
90% correct, even when s/he is guessing at random. 
A measure of ‘proportion correct’ often confounds 
accuracy and bias (e.g., when the number of signal 
and noise trials is unequal due to missing data). Signal 
detection theory is a well-developed analytic method 
for describing decision-making in a wide variety of 
domains, including social perception (for an accessible 
introduction, see, Lynn & Barrett, 2014; Tan, Luan, & 
Katsikopoulos, 2017).
Parameter d’ describes accuracy in discriminating signal 
(emotion) from noise (neutral faces), where higher d’ 
implies greater accuracy, with lower bound zero. Criterion 
c describes the threshold for detecting the presence 
of a signal (i.e., an emotion): c equals zero implies no 
bias; negative c a lower threshold for detecting emotion 
(more liberal); and positive c a higher threshold (more 
conservative). Some participants attained extreme scores 
(e.g., 0% or 100% hits and/or false alarms). Hence, we 
used the log-linear method to improve estimates (Brown 
& White, 2005; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999), applying this 
correction to all participants. 
Preliminary analyses
In a different study of the same participant group, we 
have shown that our community sample self-reports 
having experienced higher levels of neighborhood 
violence and higher levels of harsh parenting, of which 
parental aggression is a subset, than our college students 
(see Table 1 in Frankenhuis et al., 2017, for descriptive 
statistics, p-values, and Bayes Factors; at this link: https://
osf.io/r2d67). Here, we show in addition that our 
community sample (M = 1.48, SE = .06) self-reports having 
been more involved in violence than our students (M = 
1.15, SE = .03), t(136.443) = –4.784, p < .001, 95% CI [–.46, 
–.19], r = .09.5
We expected our three continuous predictors (i.e., 
parental aggression, passive exposure to neighborhood 
violence, and active involvement in violence) to be 
moderately or even highly correlated with each other. 
Therefore, we decided a priori to analyze them in separate 
models. Observed correlations ranged from .37 to .46, all 
ps < .001.
Primary analyses: Accuracy d’
A mixed between-within subjects ANOVA showed that the 
student sample (M = 2.07, SE = .07) was more accurate at 
detecting the presence of emotion than the community 
sample (M = 0.88, SE = .07), F(1, 198) = 135.23, p < .001, 
95% CI [0.99, 1.40], η2p = .41; and participants were 
more accurate at detecting emotion in response to 
anger (M = 1.57, SE = .06) than sadness (M = 1.39, 
SE = .05), F(1, 198) = 21.59, p < .001, 95% CI [0.10, 0.25], 
η2p = .10.6 However, these main effects were qualified by 
an interaction between emotion type and population, 
F(1, 198) = 5.66, p = .018, η2p = .03 (see Table 1).
Students were more accurate at detecting emotion 
in response to anger (M = 2.21, SE = .08) than sadness 
(M = 1.94, SE = .08), F(1, 198) = 24.68, p < .001, 95% CI 
[0.16, 0.37], η2p = .11. The community sample, however, 
was not more accurate at detecting emotion in response 
to anger (M = .92, SE = .08) than sadness (M = .84, SE = .08), 
F(1, 198) = 2.57, p = .111, 95% CI [–0.02, 0.19], η2p = .01. 
Comparing groups, students were more accurate than the 
community sample at detecting emotion in response to 
anger, F(1, 198) = 135.38, p < .001, 95% CI [1.07, 1.50], 
η2p = .41, and sadness, F(1, 198) = 103.53, p < .001, 95% 
CI [0.89, 1.32], η2p = .34.
Three separate between-within subjects ANOVAs, 
each adding the interaction between a standardized 
single continuous predictor and emotion type to the 
above model, revealed no interactions of emotion type 
with parental aggression, neighborhood violence, and 
involvement in violence, all Fs < 1, p = ns.
Auxiliary analyses: Bias c
A mixed between-within subjects ANOVA showed that the 
community sample had a lower threshold for detecting 
the presence of emotion (M = .12, SE = .03) than students 
did (M = .26, SE = .03), F(1, 198) = 14.39, p < .001, 95% 
CI [0.07, 0.22], η2p = .07; and participants in general 
had a lower threshold for detecting emotion in response 
to anger (M = .15, SE = .02) than sadness (M = .23, 
SE = .02), F(1, 198) = 21.59, p < .001, 95% CI [–0.13, –0.05], 
Table 1: Estimated marginal means and standard errors 
regarding accuracy (d’ ) and bias (c) as a function of 
 Emotion and Sample.
Sample Accuracy d’ Bias c
Angry Sad Angry Sad
Community 0.92 (.08) .84 (.08) .09 (.03) .14 (.03)
Student 2.21 (.08) 1.94 (.08) .20 (.03) .33 (.03)
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η2p = .10. However, these main effects were qualified by 
an interaction between emotion type and population, 
F(1, 198) = 5.66, p = .018, η2p = .03 (see Table 1).
Students had a higher threshold for detecting emotion 
in response to sadness (M = .33, SE = .03) than anger 
(M = .20, SE = .03), F(1, 198) = 24.68, p < .001, 95% CI 
[–0.19, –0.08], η2p = .11. By contrast, the community 
sample showed no higher threshold for detecting 
emotion in response to sadness (M = .14, SE = .03) than 
anger (M = .09, SE = .03), F(1, 198) = 2.57, p = .111, 95% CI 
[–0.10, 0.01], η2p = .01. 
Comparing groups, students had a higher threshold than 
the community sample for detecting emotion in response 
to anger, F(1, 198) = 5.67, p = .018, 95% CI [0.02, 0.19], 
η2p = .03, and sadness, F(1, 198) = 19.60, p < .001, 95% 
CI [0.11, 0.28], η2p = .09. Note that the within-subjects 
test statistics of this analyses are identical to those of the 
equivalent analysis of d’, because the false alarm rate used 
in both analyses is not emotion specific.
Three mixed between-within subjects ANOVAs (as 
above) revealed no marginal predictive value of any of the 
continuous predictors, all Fs < 1, p = ns.
Discussion
Contrary to our predictions, students detected emotions 
more accurately than the community sample, even 
though our descriptive statistics show that both samples 
scored well above chance (Table 2). Consistent with anger 
superiority (LoBue, 2009; Öhman et al., 2001), participants 
more accurately perceived emotion in response to anger 
than sadness. This effect, however, was driven by the 
students. The task may have been more difficult for the 
community sample, which reduced this sample’s accuracy 
on both emotions, and diminished the difference in its 
accuracy between emotions. Future work can evaluate 
this explanation by testing whether the interaction effect 
we observed replicates in an easier version of the task 
(e.g., when stimuli are displayed for longer).
Several mutually compatible factors might explain the 
community sample’s lower accuracy. First, this sample 
erred on the side of caution by having a higher rate of 
‘false alarms’ than students. As noted, such ‘erring on the 
side of caution’ can be adaptive when the costs of ‘misses’ 
are higher than those of ‘false alarms’ (Nettle & Haselton, 
2006). For our community sample, not detecting anger or 
sadness, when it is in fact present, might be costlier than 
for our student sample; for instance, if these emotions are 
more likely to be followed by behaviors that could impose 
costs (e.g., requests for help, aggression). Alternatively, 
even if the costs of ‘false alarms’ and ‘misses’ would be 
identical for our samples, it is likely that the base rates of 
negative emotions is higher for our community sample, 
because the lives of people in harsher environments are 
more strained. It would be tremendously interesting for 
future work to empirically study base rates. This could 
be done either objectively, by quantifying the relevant 
statistics of people’s natural environments (i.e., base 
rates and the extent to which emotional expressions 
predict particular behaviors), or subjectively by measuring 
people’s expectations about such statistics (i.e., their priors 
about base rates and the predictive value of emotions). 
More generally, to better understand the development 
and utility of emotion perception styles, the field would 
benefit from greater investment in quantifying the actual 
statistics of people’s lived developmental and current 
environments (e.g., Smith & Slone, 2017).
Second, the lab setting of students was more conducive 
to concentrating on the task than the on-site community 
setting. This difference was unavoidable: it was not feasible 
to bring the community sample into the lab. A more 
feasible possibility would be for a future study to bring 
an advantaged sample (e.g., students) to the community 
centers and test them there. It would be interesting to 
compare the performance of our samples when test 
settings are matched in this way. In such a study, the size 
of the computer screens should also be matched.
Third, students may have used a more effective scanning 
strategy. FitC tasks show multiple emotional expressions 
simultaneously in a single display. Participants may 
discriminate these expressions either by detecting 
emotions or based on lower-level features, such as 
the shape of eyebrows. Scanning based on lower-level 
features is known to improve performance in FitC tasks 
(Purcell & Stewart, 2010). It is possible, although to us 
not obviously plausible, that our students relied more on 
lower-level features than our community sample (note: 
this difference cannot explain the interaction effect we 
observed between emotion type and population). 
Fourth, students might truly be better at detecting 
angry and sad faces than the community sample. If so, the 
question arises why. One possibility is that psychosocial 
adversity tends to impair emotion detection, except 
in people exposed to extreme violence (e.g., victims of 
physical abuse; Pollak, 2008), for whom detection of 
danger is a vital priority. However, our analyses at the 
individual level do not support this possibility, because in 
our study participants from more hostile environments 
did not display lower accuracy. Nonetheless, if students 
would have a general advantage in emotion detection, 
they should also be better at detecting positive emotions, 
such as happiness, than the community sample. Another 
possibility is that students are specifically better at 
detecting negative emotions (and equal or actually worse 
at detecting positive emotions) because they see fewer of 
these emotions in their daily lives (a novelty effect). We 
think this explanation is unlikely, however, because we 
suspect that all adults have had ample exposure to both 
Table 2: Means and standards error regarding response 
latencies in milliseconds and proportion correct as a 
function of Emotion and Sample.




Angry Sad Angry Sad
Community 1281 (94.76) 1344 (93.45) .64 (.02) .61 (.02)
Student 577 (34.64) 563 (32.41) .83 (.01) .74 (.02)
*One sample t-tests show that all proportions correct differ 
 significantly from chance, all p’s < .001.
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anger and sadness in real interpersonal interactions and 
via diverse forms of media (e.g., TV).
Our study’s strengths include being well-powered, 
preregistered, and testing a large and heterogeneous 
sample, generating insight into a broad slice of the 
human experience. However, our study also has several 
limitations. First, as noted, the test settings inevitably 
differed between the student and the community sample. 
Second, testing our community sample in a computerized 
setting, rather than in a real-world, practical setting, may 
well have hindered their performance (Ellis et al., 2017). 
All of our students were familiar with test settings. Some 
of our community participants were not. Moreover, a 
few of them indicated feeling uncertain in a test setting 
(e.g., because they struggled in school). Third, as noted, 
we cannot rule out that some of our findings result from 
potential confounds such as group-level differences in 
scanning strategies, current stress levels, or motivation 
(note: if anything, our impression is that the community 
sample was highly motivated). Future research could 
explore the relationship between adverse experiences 
and accuracy in emotion detection using a more 
comprehensive set of adversity measures. Our observation 
that at the individual level hostile experience did not 
predict accuracy suggests that those experiences do not 
explain the community sample’s lower accuracy.
Our study illustrates some of the challenges associated 
with conducting research with diverse populations in 
naturalistic settings, such as community centers, which 
afford less control than lab settings do. Emotion research 
is well known and appreciated for its effort to study cross-
culturally and ethnically diverse populations (Barrett, 
Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011; Ekman, 1993; Elfenbein & 
Ambady, 2002). We hope that the current research of 
people with heterogeneous adversity experiences will 
connect with this tradition.
Data Accessibility Statements
Our data is stored in the DANS repository and is 
accessible at: https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-zdh-ebhk 
(Frankenhuis, 2016).
Notes
 1 We chose students as our low-adversity sample because 
we had better access to this population than to low-
adversity non-student populations, and we anticipated, 
correctly, that assessing 100 high-adversity community 
participants would be a daunting, time-consuming 
task.
 2 Including all 232 participants in our preregistered 
analyses yields the same qualitative results.
 3 We had no hypotheses about age and gender, but 
report their analyses for completeness here. Including 
gender in our preregistered analyses yields the same 
qualitative results. Consistent with the extant literature 
(McClure, 2000), women detected emotions better than 
men. This sex difference was greater in the community 
sample than in the student sample, and was mainly 
due to men in the community sample performing 
less well. Including age in our preregistered analyses 
also yields the same qualitative results. Accuracy levels 
decreased with age. With age included, the interaction 
between emotion type and population was marginally 
significant. This analysis is non-significant when all 232 
participants are included. Also, we found no evidence 
for own-gender or own-race effects.
 4 Including only paternal aggression (i.e., without 
maternal aggression) in our preregistered analyses 
yields the same qualitative results.
 5 A one-sided Bayes Factor shows these data are 9038 
times more likely to be generated by the hypothesis 
that our community sample has been more involved 
in violence than the data are to be generated by the 
null hypothesis (the two-sided Bayes Factor is 4519; 
JASP, 2016).
 6 Please note that we report the estimated marginal 
means and standard errors.
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